On March 20, 2019, the Supreme Court deferred ruling on the settlement of a class action brought against Google.  The underlying action was based on Google’s transmission of a users’ search terms, i.e., “referrer headers”, to its actual clients.   Class counsel argued that the transmission and storage of these referrer headers was in violation of both federal and state law given those conducting the searches never gave proper consent.  

In remanding the case to address a potential lack of standing, the Court ruled “[b]ecause there remain substantial questions about whether any of the named plaintiffs has standing to sue in light of our decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___ (2016), we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand for further proceedings.”  This was obviously the correct ruling given a court cannot even hear a matter unless there is proper standing to sue. Given that the Supreme Court only decides matters properly on appeal and the question of standing was not put before it, the matter required a remand.

Disregarding the tortious procedural history of this near-decade old case or the reasons why standing may not exist, this case will hopefully substantively address the court-approved settlement that would require “Google to include certain disclosures on some of its webpages and would distribute more than $5 million to cy pres recipients, more than $2 million to class counsel, and no money to absent class members.”  In other words, the Court will hopefully decide whether the lower court improperly approved the settlement given the individuals purportedly harmed would not have received a penny and the alleged improper conduct described in the complaint would have still continued unabated.  

In his Dissent, Justice Thomas believed the bare minimum threshold of standing was met and the case should have been reversed on substantive grounds because the cy pres fund settlement was violative of the Rules as it offered no compensation to the certified class.  As previously discussed, cy pres fund settlements – which can provide millions to advocacy groups approved by the defendant, hardly evoke the hallmark of justice given those purportedly harmed actually receive nothing.  Indeed, the use of cy pres funds has long been “a troublesome trend in privacy class action settlements given it allows plaintiffs’ counsel to quickly file and resolve class actions before  actual damages can be made readily apparent.” It is no surprise various Attorney Generals have pushed hard against these sort of settlements.

As pointed out by one of the attorneys who appealed this Google case to the Supreme Court, today’s ruling likely “simply delays the day of reckoning for this unfair practice.”  Justice Thomas recognized today that there was something particularly odious about a settlement that only benefited lawyers and those third-party organizations acceptable to the Defendant.  Hopefully, in the near future the full Court will reach the same conclusion and put an end to this unsavory practice of rewarding a defendant’s “non-profit partners” rather than the actual litigants.

On February 22, 2019, an amendment to the CCPA – S.B. 561, was proposed that would do away with a cure provision, expand the statutory damages provision to any violation of the law, and limit the role of the Attorney General in policing violations by directly passing along greater rights to consumers.  If passed, these changes will significantly alter the reach of the law by making the plaintiff’s bar’s arsenal even wider and the law’s penalties that much stronger.   Previously, the California Consumer Privacy Act – which will come online in 2020, was the first major privacy initiative to provide for statutory damages in the event of a data breach.

California’s Governor also recently said that he was “now convening a team to look into the creation of a new law requiring technology giants to kick back some of their billions in earnings in the form of a Data Dividend for Californians.” California is not waiting around for federal privacy action – it is outright looking to lead the world when it comes to the creation of statutory privacy rights.

UPDATE: April 4, 2019

On April 4, 2019, Senate Bill 753 was proposed to amend CCPA and provide for a major new exception to the law’s reach. If passed, “a business does not sell personal information” under CCPA if the following applies:

(E) (i) Pursuant to a written contract, the business shares, discloses, or otherwise communicates to another business or third party an online identifier, an Internet Protocol address, a cookie identifier, a device identifier, or any unique identifier only to the extent necessary to deliver, show, measure, or otherwise serve or audit a specific advertisement to the consumer. (ii) The contract specified in clause (i) shall prohibit the other business or third party from sharing, selling, or otherwise communicating the information except as necessary to deliver, show, measure, or otherwise serve or audit an advertisement from the business.

In effect, there would be a Google and Facebook exception to CCPA.

It remains to be seen whether this amendment proposed by State Senator Henry Stern will ever be enacted but the mere fact it was proposed is a stark reminder that those companies with the most to lose have not stopped fighting this battle – whether by way of this proposed amendment to CCPA or by way of a broad preemption quest in Congress.

UPDATE: April 24, 2019

In opposition to S.B. 753, a coalition of privacy advocates wrote: “In sum, this new exception would remove the ability of consumers to prevent the dissemination of their personal information from the website they are visiting to any third party, allowing their personal information to flow unchecked into the ad-exchange system, after which a consumer can never regain future control. ”

As reported by DLA’s Jim Halpert, during the Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting of April 23, 2019, State Sen. Stern apparently bowed to the pressure and withdrew S.B. 753 from further consideration.

In addition to S.B. 561, the other amendment most likely to see success is State Assemblywoman Jacqui Irwin’s A.B. 873 – which places parameters on de-identified information and limits the present potentially unbounded scope of “personal information”. Thankfully, given the attention being placed on these issues, it is very likely that the ambiguities rushed into the statute’s initial draft will be sorted out and corrected before CCPA comes online in 2020.

On February 7, 2019– in a devastating blow to global surveillance advertising, Germany’s antitrust arm, the Federal Cartel Office, ruled that Facebook’s tying of its data collection practices to usage of its services was unlawful.  In the public announcement of this ruling, the FCO president Andreas Mundt said:  “Facebook will no longer be allowed to force its users to agree to the practically unrestricted collection and assigning of non-Facebook data to their Facebook user accounts.” 

Not surprisingly, Facebook immediately blogged that it would file an appeal of this potentially ruinous ruling.  Though not ultimately based on the lack of “freely given” consent under GDPR, the ruling may ultimately have the same impact as if it were.  Interestingly, Facebook has previously shouted from the roofs that it was compliant with GDPR but never warned of a potential antitrust exposure – including in its most recent Annual Report.  

Other countries may also choose to use the antitrust route rather than wait on the pending Complaints filed against Facebook.  None of this should come as any surprise to Facebook given its own CEO saw the company as a “social utility” well over a decade ago.   

Interestingly, the FCO ruling considers the harm derived from Facebook’s data collection practices as the user’s “loss of control” rather than any specific pecuniary harm.  If affirmed, this novel antitrust ruling could be a watershed in surveillance advertising sufficient to crack the existing digital ad ecosystem and allowing for new business models to finally take hold.